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Unlike mirror self-recognition, recognizing one’s own image in
delayed video footage may indicate the presence of a concept of
self that extends across time and space. While humans typically
show this ability around 4 years of age, it is unknown whether
this capacity is found in non-human animals. In this study,
chimpanzees performed a modified version of the mark test to
investigate whether chimpanzees could remove stickers placed
on the face and head while watching live and delayed video
images. The results showed that three of five chimpanzees
consistently removed the mark in delayed-viewing conditions,
while they removed the stickers much less frequently in control
video conditions which lacked a link to their current state.
These findings suggest that chimpanzees, like human children
at the age of 4 years and more, can comprehend temporal
dissociation in their concept of self.
1. Introduction
The ability to recognize one’s own appearance is assumed to be a
proxy for complex psychological processes such as self-awareness
and the concept of self [1,2]. Human infants begin to show self-
recognition in mirrors from 18 to 24 months but do not exhibit
self-recognition in delayed video images for another 2 years [3–7].
Previous works have debated the developmental asynchrony of
live and delayed self-recognition. One theory holds that while
self-recognition in a mirror requires a self-concept limited to
the present time and location, delayed recognition requires a
‘self-concept proper’ in which one’s sense of identity extends
across time and space, which develops somewhat later than the
ability for live self-recognition [8]. An extension of this theory
is that delayed self-recognition is linked to autobiographical
memory and that both delayed self-recognition and manifestation
of autobiographical memory develop at almost the same time in
human children, at around 4 years of age [8]. However, there
has been no evidence to confirm this theory, and factors that
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are not specific to self-recognition might be involved in this developmental asynchrony [5,9]. In addition,
a similar concept of developmental asynchrony has been reported between self-recognition in mirrors
and live videos [10], and more data are warranted to prove this theory.
From a phylogenetic perspective, chimpanzees and other great apes have been shown to exhibit
self-recognition in mirror studies [11–17], and this phenomenon has been reported in dolphins and
elephants [18,19]. However, there is little evidence regarding whether animals can recognize themselves
in images from different time periods. One study found that monkeys spent more time looking at
live versus delayed video images of themselves [20]. Gorillas were also observed to show more
interest in live videos compared with images recorded the day before [21]. Chimpanzees were able to
discriminate between cursor movements on a computer monitor caused by real-time self-action and
those caused by previously recorded self-action [22]. However, differences in viewing time and the ability
to discriminate between images do not necessarily imply self-recognition. Thus, there is no clear evidence
that recognition of delayed self-image occurred in these studies. This study used a modified version of
the classic mark test to determine whether chimpanzees could remove stickers placed on their face and
head while watching live and delayed video images. One study reported that 3-year-old human children,
during the transition from live self-recognition ability to the capacity for delayed self-recognition, do
not remove stickers from the head while viewing 2 s delayed images of themselves, but do so while
watching live or 1 s delayed self-images [6]. That study on children indicates that comprehending a few
seconds’ delay is a critical factor for developing self-recognition. In this study, we tested chimpanzees’
reactions to live and 1–4 s delayed images along with additional control videos, which lacked a link to
their current state.
The aim of this study was to explore the reactions of chimpanzees to their delayed self-image. We
tested five chimpanzees in experimental sessions beginning with the placement of 10 stickers on the
head or face of a fully awake chimpanzee. Following a 2 min observation period during which no image
was shown on the monitor, one of eight types of video was then presented on the monitor for 2 min.
These included: a live self-video; a 1 s delayed self-video; a 2 s delayed self-video; a 4 s delayed self-
video; a distant past video (more than one week old) showing the subject with stickers on the face and
head; a distant past video (more than one week old) of the subject with no stickers on the face or head;
a video of a human with stickers on the face and head; and a video of a human with no stickers on the
face or head. Each chimpanzee watched five repeats of each of the eight conditions.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Participants
Five chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) participated in this study. All subjects lived in a group together
at the Great Ape Research Institute, Hayashibara Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., Japan, in an enriched
environment consisting of a 7400 m2 outdoor enclosure and several indoor areas [23].The group consisted
of Loi (male, 10 years old), Zamba (male, 10 years old), Tsubaki (female, 10 years old), Mizuki (female,
9 years old) and Misaki (female, 7 years old; note that these data refer to age at the start of the test period).
Mizuki was raised by human carers from a few days after birth at another biomedical institute. Since
arriving at the Great Ape Research Institute (at age 2 years and 1 month), she has spent the majority of her
time with other chimpanzees in outdoor and indoor compounds. Loi, Zamba, Tsubaki and Misaki were
mother-reared at another biomedical institute until they were about 3 years old, after which they moved
to the Great Ape Research Institute and spent time together in outdoor and indoor compounds. All of
these chimpanzees had had extensive interaction with human researchers, including sleeping together
in their night room and undergoing previous behavioural cognitive experiments [23]. Various fruits and
vegetables were provided 3–10 times a day. Water was freely available, and the chimpanzees were never
food-deprived. The research protocol was approved by the Animal Welfare and Animal Care Committee
of Hayashibara Great Ape Research Institute (GARI-051101).
2.2. Observations and pretests prior to the experiment
While a formal test for mirror self-recognition was not conducted until the pretest period of the present
experiment described below, it should be noted that all chimpanzees were exposed to a mobile mirror
during their daily interactions with human researchers for environmental enrichment. In addition, one
of their indoor rooms was equipped with a mirror positioned on the wall and there was also a reflective




stainless steel surface in the playground that could be used as a mirror. Systematic data were not collected
on chimpanzees’ prior responses to mirrors and reflective surfaces. However, researchers and caretakers
had observed on multiple occasions that the three chimpanzees who exhibited self-recognition in live and
delayed tests in this study (Loi, Tsubaki and Mizuki) had all looked at mirrors and reflective surfaces and
made self-directed gestures, such as opening the mouth and looking into it. The other two individuals
(Zamba and Misaki) were never observed using mirrors or reflective surfaces in this way prior to the
current test.
Before the delayed video testing, one pretest session involving mirror exposure and three pretest
sessions involving live video exposure were conducted. An experimental room that was hexagonal in
cross-section, 7.6 m2 in area and 5 m tall, was used for these sessions. The pretest was conducted to
confirm whether chimpanzees could recognize their own mirror image. Loi and Zamba both entered
the experimental room by themselves. Tsubaki was accompanied by her dependent infant. Mizuki and
Misaki were not related, but had a close bond and came together to the experimental room. This pair
also gave birth to their baby during the course of the experiment, who subsequently accompanied
them. Familiar experimenters (S.H. and K.F.) stayed in the same room with the chimpanzees during
testing. Additional staff were occasionally in the room, typically to take care of the infants who were not
being tested.
The pretest session involved three main steps. In step 1, four circular stickers (silver and 8 mm
in diameter) were placed on areas directly visible to the chimpanzee (i.e. one sticker per arm and
leg). Responses were then observed for about 30 s. In step 2, 10 circular stickers were placed on the
chimpanzee’s face and head. Based on the close and long-term relationships between the chimpanzees
and the researchers, the five chimpanzees accepted placement of stickers without apparent distress. In
contrast with many previous studies using the mark test [1], we did not anaesthetize the chimpanzees
or surreptitiously place stickers on them, because it has been shown that these factors are not crucial
components of the self-recognition test [12]. We also felt that surreptitious placement could not be
ensured during the repetitive implementation of the tests and repetitive anaesthesia for the purpose
of this study would have been inappropriate. After the placement of stickers, each chimpanzee’s
spontaneous behaviour towards their own bodies was observed for 2 min without exposure to the mirror.
To ensure that the chimpanzee remained in a relaxed state in their location to enable recording of their
behaviour, an experimenter gave a small piece of food about every 20 s during this period. Receiving food
during cognitive testing is a routine procedure for chimpanzees, and provides motivation to participate
in experiments, although participation in testing was voluntary and they could obtain meals even if
they did not take part. In step 3, after 2 min had elapsed, a 30× 40 cm mirror was placed in front of the
chimpanzee and their behaviour was again observed for 2 min while food was offered approximately
every 20 s, regardless of the chimpanzee’s behaviour during the test.
Three pretest sessions involving live video exposure were conducted. The aim of this pretest was
to habituate the chimpanzees to the presence of a monitor and to provide experimenters with an
opportunity to practise the delayed video testing procedures described below. In addition, these video
images were used for the sessions of the delayed test for conditions 5 and 6 (see below). A video camera
was placed at the top of the 19-inch monitor that presented the live video footage, and filmed an area
from slightly below the chin to slightly above the top of the head. This camera was one of the two
cameras used to record all testing sessions. The image on the monitor was flipped from the normal
orientation, to ensure that the left–right correspondence was the same as that of a mirror image. The
three-step procedure for this video pretest was the same as the pretest involving the mirror, except that
the chimpanzee’s image was displayed on a monitor rather than a mirror. An experimenter gave a small
piece of food in the same manner as in the mirror exposure test. The experimenter stayed outside of the
range covered by the video camera but their hand become visible on the monitor when food was given
to the chimpanzee.
2.3. Delayed video testing
The test was conducted in the same indoor experimental room, and familiar experimenters (S.H. and
K.F.) stayed in the same room with the chimpanzees during testing (figure 1). In step 1, one of the
experimenters placed 10 circular stickers (silver, 8 mm in diameter) on the chimpanzee’s face and head.
After sticker placement, each chimpanzee’s spontaneous behaviour was observed for 2 min during which
no images were shown on the 19-inch monitor. A video camera was placed at the top of the monitor. The
camera recorded a view of the area from slightly below the chin to slightly above the top of the head of
the chimpanzee. There was a second camera that recorded the entire testing area.




Figure 1. Experimental set-up. A male chimpanzee faces a monitor. Stickers are placed on his face and head.
In step 2, one of the following eight videos (conditions 1–8) was presented for 2 min: a live video
(condition 1), a 1 s delayed video (condition 2), a 2 s delayed video (condition 3), a 4 s delayed video
(condition 4), a video of the subject that was filmed more than one week prior in which stickers had
been placed on the face and head of the subject (condition 5), a video of the subject that was filmed more
than one week prior, in which no stickers were present on the face and head (condition 6), a video of
a human who had stickers placed on the face and head (condition 7) or a video of a human with no
stickers (condition 8). In steps 1 and 2, an experimenter gave a small piece of food about every 20 s to
ensure that the chimpanzee remained in a relaxed state to enable recording of their behaviour, regardless
of the chimpanzee’s behaviour during the test.
For the live video condition, the image filmed by the camera placed at the top of the monitor
(described above) was presented on the monitor. The image on the monitor was flipped from the normal
orientation to ensure that the image shown was the same as that of a mirror image. The 1 s, 2 s and 4 s
delayed conditions were created using a special device (VM-700, ITO Co. Ltd., Osaka, Japan) that was
plugged into the same video camera. For conditions 5 and 6 in which the delay exceeded 1 week, we
edited video scenes recorded during the prior testing and/or pretest involving live video exposure. For
condition 5, we edited the video to include only images of the chimpanzee in which (i) there were more
than three stickers on their face and head, and (ii) no self-directed behaviour was evident to ensure there
was no coincidental matching of the subject’s current self-directed behaviour to that of the pre-recorded
video. For condition 6, we edited the video to ensure that there were no stickers nor any self-directed
behaviour. For the human videos, we recorded a person with whom the subjects were familiar but who
was not present during testing. In both human videos, the models engaged in slight, natural movements
so that the video was not a still image, but no self-directed behaviour occurred. The only difference
between the two human videos was the presence (condition 7) or absence (condition 8) of 10 stickers
located upon the head and face.
Each session contained two conditions, each starting from step 1. We conducted 20 sessions for each
of the five chimpanzees; thus, there were 40 conditions and five repeats of each of the eight conditions.
The order of conditions was counterbalanced. The sessions were separated by at least one week, with
an average of one month to avoid habituation and maintain the subjects’ interest. The entire test (20
sessions) was carried out across 2 years and 2 months.





The following behaviours were coded from the video recordings: (1) removal of stickers, (2) self-
directed behaviour toward the head or face (i.e. the subject touching the face or head with their hand),
(3) contingency checking behaviour, such as opening the mouth and shaking the hands and (4) looking
at the monitor. Notably, (i) the removal of stickers is not mutually exclusive with self-directed behaviour,
and the former requires the latter and (ii) the coding of whether a subject was watching the monitor
overlaps with other coded behaviours. Specifically, the coding included: ‘removal of the sticker while
watching the monitor’, ‘removal of the sticker while not watching the monitor’, ‘self-directed behaviour
while watching the monitor’, ‘self-directed behaviour while not watching the monitor’, plus contingency
checking behaviour.
The number of stickers on a subject’s face and head at the start of the test (i.e. when the monitor
was switched on) varied, as some of the 10 stickers originally placed were removed by subjects’ groping
behaviour. Therefore, we calculated the proportion of the number of stickers that were removed during
the test by dividing the number of stickers removed during the test by the number of stickers at the start
of the test, and compared these proportions across experimental conditions. We continued recording each
subject’s behaviour for 2 min after the start of the test, but the chimpanzees occasionally removed all of
the stickers before the 2 min had elapsed. In such cases, we considered the time until the subject removed
the last sticker as the test period, and calculated the proportion of the duration of a particular behaviour
(e.g. self-directed behaviour while watching the monitor) by dividing the duration of that behaviour by
this adjusted test period.
A rater who was unaware of the experimental conditions and hypotheses coded all of the video
recordings. A second rater coded 20% of the sessions to measure inter-rater reliability. Cohen’s κ for the
above-mentioned four mutually exclusive coding categories was 0.813 (p< 0.001). The statistical tests
were non-parametric as we could not assume normality in the dataset. Data from each individual was
treated separately because there were individual differences in responses.
3. Results
3.1. Pretests with mirror and live video exposure
Three chimpanzees (Loi, Tsubaki and Mizuki) removed all of the stickers while watching mirror and live
video images during the pretests. The remaining two individuals (Zamba and Misaki) did not remove
any stickers placed on their face and head during the mirror and live video exposure pretests, but they
removed all of the stickers placed on the visible parts of the body such as the arms and legs.
3.2. Delayed video testing
The proportion of stickers removed across the eight conditions among the five subject chimpanzees was
not significantly different on the group level (Friedman’s test, p= 0.36). However, there were statistically
significant differences in the proportion of stickers removed while watching the monitor across the
eight conditions (Friedman’s test, p= 0.008) and the proportion of time spent engaging in self-directed
behaviour while watching the monitor across the eight conditions (Friedman’s test, p= 0.018) on the
group level (figure 2). Because there were large individual differences in the chimpanzees’ responses,
below we describe the results further on an individual level.
Three of five chimpanzees (Loi, Tsubaki and Mizuki) consistently engaged in self-directed behaviours,
exhibiting hand/finger actions directed to their own face and head, and removing the stickers while
watching the image on the monitor in the live, 1 s, 2 s and 4 s delay conditions (conditions 1–4; electronic
supplementary material, movie S1, S2). The responses of these three individuals were significantly
different across the eight conditions according to the following three measures: the proportion of stickers
removed (Kruskal–Wallis test, Loi, H= 20.43, p< 0.01; Tsubaki, H= 25.68, p< 0.01; Mizuki, H= 25.08,
p< 0.01; figure 2a), the proportion of stickers removed while watching the monitor (Loi, H= 20.86,
p< 0.01; Tsubaki, H= 21.57, p< 0.01; Mizuki, H= 24.88, p< 0.01; figure 2b) and the proportion of time
spent engaging in self-directed behaviour while watching the monitor (Loi, H= 21.54, p< 0.01; Tsubaki,
H= 23.61, p< 0.01; Mizuki, H= 29.88, p< 0.01; figure 2c).
Conditions 5–8 were used to rule out the possibility that the self-directed behaviour we observed
while chimpanzees watched the monitor would emerge when viewing any stimuli on the monitor





































































































































































Figure 2. Responses of chimpanzees to video conditions. Each data point represents the average of five trials. (a) Proportion of stickers
removed during the test period across different experimental conditions. (b) Proportion of stickers removed while the chimpanzee was
watching the monitor across different experimental conditions. (c) Proportion of time engaged in self-directed behaviour while the
chimpanzee was watching the monitor across different experimental conditions.




(condition 8), mere appearance of stickers in the image shown on the monitor (condition 7), a self-
image video with no stickers (condition 6), or a self-image video without relevance to their current state
(condition 5). The proportion of time spent on self-directed behaviour while watching the monitor was
not different between the live and briefly delayed conditions (1–4 s; Fligner–Wolfe’s test, Loi, FW= 135,
p= 0.053; Tsubaki, FW= 50, p= 0.87; Mizuki, FW= 155, p= 0.87), whereas the corresponding proportions
of self-directed behaviour were significantly lower in conditions 5–8 (Fligner–Wolfe’s test, Loi, FW= 210,
p< 0.001; Tsubaki, FW= 223, p= 0.009; Mizuki, FW= 210, p< 0.001).
One of the three chimpanzees who engaged in self-directed behaviour, Mizuki, exhibited contingency
checking in the early stages of testing during trials in which past-self videos were shown (electronic
supplementary material, movie S3). The other two chimpanzees, Loi and Tsubaki, did not exhibit
contingency checking behaviour, but did engage in several self-directed behaviours while watching the
videos for conditions 5–8.
To test for the possible effects of learning during the course of the experiment, we examined responses
across sessions. The result showed no statistically significant increases or decreases in the three measures
as a function of session in (i) the proportion of stickers removed, (ii) the proportion of time spent
engaging in self-directed behaviour while watching the monitor, and (iii) the proportion of stickers
removed while watching the monitor (Jonckheere–Terpstra’s test, p> 0.1 for all of the individuals).
Moreover, the three chimpanzees who exhibited evidence of recognition while watching delayed videos
each removed one or more stickers during the first presentations (4 s delay in the case of Loi and 2 s delay
in the case of Tsubaki and Mizuki; the order of conditions was varied across subjects to counterbalance
among individuals).
4. Discussion
Our study found that three of the chimpanzees tested consistently removed the stickers in delayed-
viewing conditions. The current procedure differed from the classic mark test in that we did not
place stickers surreptitiously under anaesthesia or during play [1,14]. Instead, we placed stickers non-
surreptitiously while the chimpanzees were awake, in line with reports that the surreptitious placement
of marks is not critical for investigating self-image recognition in the mark test in chimpanzees [12].
In the classic mark test, the frequency of self-directed behaviour is compared with that of a baseline
period before the subject has viewed self-images. By contrast, we compared the frequency of self-directed
behaviour across eight conditions. Four of the eight conditions (conditions 5–8) served as a baseline, in
the sense that self-directed behaviours in these conditions were elicited without the subject recognizing
the link between the image on the monitor and the current state of the self. The results revealed that self-
directed behaviour was more frequent in the live and 1–4 s delay conditions than in the other conditions,
demonstrating that these three subjects were able to discriminate whether the image shown reflected
the current state of the self or not. In other words, our results suggest that the three chimpanzees were
capable of self-recognition in live and delayed self-images.
The contingency checking behaviour of one of the chimpanzees, Mizuki, during trials in which past-
self videos were shown suggests that she was actively probing the presence or absence of contingency
while she was watching the video. The other two chimpanzees that removed stickers consistently,
Loi and Tsubaki, did not exhibit contingency checking behaviour, but did engage in several self-
directed behaviours while watching the videos for conditions 5–8. These self-directed behaviours
probably facilitated the subjects’ recognition of the lack of contingency when they were watching
videos that were more than one week old in conditions 5 and 6, as the self-directed behaviours
were removed from these videos. Previous studies have shown that contingency checking behaviour
is a possible learning mechanism underlying successful performance in mirror self-recognition by
apes [12] and human children [24]. In addition, capuchin monkeys were able to detect contingency
but did not engage in active contingency checking behaviour nor showed evidence of mirror self-
recognition [20,25]. Therefore, the emergence of contingency checking behaviour can be considered
as an important sign of self-recognition in mirror or video images from both ontogenetic and
phylogenetic perspectives.
Our analysis of possible changes in the chimpanzees’ behavioural responses during the entire period
of study (over more than 2 years) did not identify any trends in recognition. The three chimpanzees
exhibited evidence of recognition while watching delayed videos during the first presentations,
indicating that the chimpanzees were able to recognize their self-image in the delayed video conditions
from the beginning of the experiments.




We have thus far discussed the positive results from three of five chimpanzees. The other two
chimpanzees exhibited almost no self-directed behaviour or removal of stickers placed on the head and
face (figure 2). Importantly, this pattern is consistent with most prior mirror-recognition tests involving
chimpanzees, in which reported passing rates typically vary between 20% and 80% [1,15–17].
While the interpretation of these negative results remains unclear, individual variation in the capacity
for self-recognition is possible and motivational factors may also play a role. However, the two
chimpanzees easily removed the visible stickers that were placed on their arms and legs. Therefore,
the fact that these two individuals did not remove the stickers that were placed on non-visible parts of
their face cannot be ascribed to simple lack of motivation to remove the stickers. There may be individual
variations in the depth of the level of self-recognition in chimpanzees. Alternatively, subtle differences
in the rearing environment may have led to the varied performance in this task. A cross-country study
of human children found cultural differences in their mirror self-recognition [26]. Thus, the fact that
experience and other environmental factors affect self-recognition may be common to chimpanzees
and humans.
Researchers have reported similarities in various types of higher cognitive functioning between
chimpanzees and humans, such as memory, tool-use and symbolic representation [27]. The present
findings extend our understanding of the capacity for self-recognition in chimpanzees and humans,
suggesting that both species can comprehend temporal dissociation in their concept of self. In one study
with human children, a 3-year-old boy was reported to say ‘This is my friend, isn’t it’, after watching a
2 s delay video of himself. This indicates that the boy was unable to recognize himself when the video
was delayed by 2 s, even though he was able to recognize himself in a mirror [6]. This example indicates
that temporal matching plays an important role in visual self-recognition of children under 4 years of
age and that inserting a brief delay disrupts their self-recognition. Children begin to understand delayed
self-image at around 4 years of age, at which point they are generally able to recognize themselves over
time and project themselves into the past. This ability has previously been proposed to be uniquely
human [28].
There may be criticism against our study, as our method was different from the classic mark
test and the subject chimpanzees knew that the stickers were being placed. A future direction of
study would be to use the classic mark test paradigm, which requires surreptitious placement of a
marker/sticker, to investigate delayed self-recognition in non-human animals. However, this approach
would face the following two challenges: first, it would be difficult to secure a sufficiently large
number of subjects. Surreptitious placement of a marker/sticker is ideally accomplished as a single
trial, as has been seen in studies with human children that used between-subject comparisons to test
live versus delayed self-recognition [3–7]. To conduct between-subject comparison across live versus
multiple delayed conditions, a large number of subjects are needed, particularly considering the fact
that not all chimpanzees displayed self-recognition, even in the live condition. Second, if within-subject
comparisons are used instead of between-subject comparison, then repetitive surreptitious placement of
a marker/sticker to the same subject is necessary. This is not an easy task, as the likelihood of failure
to place the marker surreptitiously (i.e. the chimpanzee notices the placement of the marker) increases
with repetition.
Furthermore, if such a study relied on using dye that cannot be removed easily as a marker (as in the
case of original study with chimpanzees [1]), chimpanzees may become habituated to the presence of dye
that cannot be removed. Thus, they may become less motivated to engage in self-directed behaviours
to remove the dye. This is the reason that we used removable stickers in our study; that is, we felt
that surreptitious placement of stickers could not be ensured during repetitive trials using the methods
previously established. We acknowledge that verification of our modified version of the mark test is
warranted, and a novel technique is necessary to overcome the challenges described above to apply
the classic mark test for delayed condition. With that said, some evidence suggests that surreptitious
marking or anaesthesia is not a necessary condition for testing self-recognition. Fully informing the
subjects about the placement of a mark did not enhance performance in a mirror self-recognition
task in human infants [12]. Monkeys who were trained to touch a mark in an operant conditioning
paradigm still failed to pass the mark test for mirror self-recognition [29]. Our data were consistent with
these findings. That is, the three chimpanzees that showed positive evidence in the delayed condition
also showed positive evidence (i.e. removal of stickers) in all of the mirror and live video conditions
that were conducted as pretests. As suggested by Bard et al. [12], we consider that overt marking,
without the need for anaesthesia and isolation at testing, is a useful method for future comparative and
developmental studies.




Another future direction of study would be to extend the duration of the delay to match that of most
of the human studies [4,5,7,9]. As our study is the first systematic observation of chimpanzees’ reaction
to delayed self-images, further research using different approaches will be necessary to validate our
findings.
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